General Motors versus Toyota – who will win?

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General Motors just reported a 41% reduction in its second quarter Net Income to $1.5 billion with a $1.8 billion decrease in Sales.

The main source of the GM decline was its European operations. Its future results are questionable as USA sales forecast predicts declines. Both of which are understandable in this difficult economic environment.

But, Toyota reported a huge increase for the same time period. Its Net Income was $3.17 billion on robust sales growth – profit was 111% greater than GM’s. Its sales forecast expects substantial increases.

Can GM be successful up against Toyota and other Asian manufacturers?

Toyota’s USA based operations have lower product costs compared to GM because their hourly factory labor wages are lower – further compounded by lower health care and retirement costs. Toyota has a leaner salaried organization and thus lower overhead costs. These significant issues were not dealt with during GM’s bankruptcy.

GM is not the best cost producer in its industry and, as a result, will decline. Its profit margins and free cash flow will be squeezed resulting in less capital available to develop new products and productive manufacturing systems and equipment.

Will this bring GM to its knees again?

Most likely.

Click on the following links to read my earlier posts with greater details of GM’s issues:

General Motors - Industry Leader? 

GM & Chrysler Bankruptcies

UPDATES:  

On August 15^th Forbes published a thorough analysis of General Motor’s declining performance entitled GeneralMotors Is Headed For Bankruptcy – Again -  a worthwhile read.

A September 10^th Reuters’ article, Insight: GM Volt: the ugly math of low sales, high costs,  details General Motors costly failure with the Chevrolet Volt – a loss of $49,000 on each car. Couple this failure with the Chevy Malibu being rated dead last versus five competitive vehicles in Car and Driver magazine’s comparison tests raises two questions: Is GM well managed? Can it succeed?

These product failures signal the absence of coordination and cross-functional communication among GM’s operating functions. In particular, for these two product failures, are product engineering, marketing, manufacturing engineering and cost accounting working in sync?

In my experience there is an absence of open and candid communication through all levels of distressed, troubled companies. Cross-functional communication is always missing. Consequently mistakes mount, problems fester.

Cross-functional communication requires that the CEO uses it and demonstrates that it is an integral part of the company’s culture. Absent that it is difficult for functional officers and mangers to use it – the negative politics of some human beings results in certain people being unwilling to participate in this style of management. Need a fully competent and self-confident CEO - highly knowledgable of what goes on in the bowels of a manufacturing company.

If its faults are not corrected, the prediction that GM will reenter bankruptcy may come true.

October 31 and November 5. Toyota’s net income tripled and market share increased while General Motor’s net income declined12%.
 

Ford Motor Company Reports Profit – Positives and Negatives

The Positives:

“…the only major U.S. automaker to avoid bankruptcy, posted third-quarter net income of $997 million and its first operating profit since early 2008…”.

“…finished the third quarter with $23.8 billion in automotive cash, up from $21 billion at the end of the second quarter.”

“…U.S. market share increased to 15.8 percent for the first nine months, compared with 14.8 percent from a year earlier…”.

Certainly, registering a third-quarter 2009 positive profit with a market share gain are excellent and solid signals. Unfortunately it overlooks Ford’s negatives, which give pause and concern for the future.

The Negatives:

“…workers have overwhelmingly rejected contract changes that would have allowed the automaker to cut labor costs.” “Ford sought the deal to bring its labor costs in line with Detroit rivals Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors Co….”.

Bringing Ford's hourly labor costs in line with General Motor's and Chrysler's should not be the priority. The priority is to become cost competitive with USA based Japanese automotive manufacturers. Ford's, GM's and Chrysler's hourly base wage rates and benefit costs are reportedly $20 to $30 per hour higher than Japanese competitors. Doubtful these costs were reduced in the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies. This remains a huge problem.

“…workers felt they were being asked to sacrifice more than the company's executives. Ford CEO Alan Mulally made $17.7 million last year…”.

There is some justification in the Unionized Employees position on this issue. Hourly employees are well aware that officers of a major company have significantly higher incomes. This is not an issue in healthy economic times. But in poor economic periods, if Management is perceived as not sacrificing with all on board, then a disconnect is created, and polarization with contract rejection occurs.

A helpful signal for Unionized employees, to convey Management is being serious about reducing overhead costs, is if Ford has cut back on some Executive perks. Does Ford still have an executive dining room, replete with waitresses, multi-course menus, and silver finger bowls?

“He (Alan Mulally, CEO) hasn’t presided over an annual profit at Ford, which has posted three straight full-year losses totaling $30 billion.”

Other questions exist. For example, did the quarterly profit rely heavily on favorable product mix and pricing? Will these same conditions be available in future fiscal years?

The list of negatives should not detract from the solid job Mr. Mulally and his team has done in beginning Ford's turn around. The challenges are enormous, and Mr. Mulally has clearly moved it in the right direction.

Mitt Romney Advises: “Let Detroit Go Bankrupt”

Governor Mitt Romney offers some interesting advice regarding the Big Three in his November 18, 2008 New York Times Op-Ed “Let Detroit Go Bankrupt” summarized as follows:

“If General Motors, Ford and Chrysler get the bailout that their chief executives asked for yesterday, you can kiss the American automotive industry goodbye. It won’t go overnight, but its demise will be virtually guaranteed.

Without that bailout, Detroit will need to drastically restructure itself. With it, the automakers will stay the course — the suicidal course of declining market shares, insurmountable labor and retiree burdens, technology atrophy, product inferiority and never-ending job losses. Detroit needs a turnaround, not a check.

First, their huge disadvantage in costs relative to foreign brands must be eliminated. That means new labor agreements to align pay and benefits to match those of workers at competitors like BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, retiree benefits must be reduced so that the total burden per auto for domestic makers is not higher than that of foreign producers.

That extra burden is estimated to be more than $2,000 per car…But if this cost penalty persists, any bailout will only delay the inevitable.

Second, management as is must go. New faces should be recruited from unrelated industries…

In a managed bankruptcy, the federal government would propel newly competitive and viable automakers, rather than seal their fate with a bailout check.”

Governor Romney is correct.

In a July post on my blog I opined that running out of cash may be the trigger that puts them into bankruptcy, but it will be a blessing in disguise. My reasoning is that the Big Three’s hourly labor costs are reportedly $20 to $30 higher than their USA based Japanese competitors. In my experience as a Turnaround CEO, this will not be reduced in a voluntary agreement with their union. If it is not corrected, they will continue to decline and probably will not survive.

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection does not mean the end. The companies will continue to operate. While it will be a severe shock to the USA, it is not liquidation. It will allow modification of the factors contributing to losing money - including the high cost labor contracts.

Click here to review my July 28, 2008 post: “Bankruptcy – The Fate of General Motors, Ford and Chrysler?”

Bankruptcy - The Fate of General Motors, Ford and Chrysler?

General Motors, Ford and Chrysler may have to enter into Bankruptcy to reduce their hourly cost of labor. Running out of cash may be the trigger that puts one or all of them into bankruptcy, but it will be a blessing in disguise.

One of their most significant problems is that their hourly labor costs are reportedly $20 to $30 per hour higher than their Japanese competitors. Some of the differential will be reduced with the UAW’s assumption of retiree health care with VEBA -- Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association – beginning in 2010. This could reduce employee health insurance costs by one-third but will only produce a relatively small reduction in hourly labor costs. This won’t be enough - including consideration of the two-tier wage structure.

Most of the Japanese competitors have non-union hourly labor in their USA manufacturing operations. As such, their labor costs will not significantly increase over time. In fact, they will probably decrease because of higher capital investments with more effective productivity improvements.

By comparison, GM, Ford and Chrysler are at a distinct disadvantage. They are strapped for cash which severely limits their ability to invest capital for operating improvements. Recent plant closings and operational restructuring have reduced their overall costs by billions of dollars, as well as their hourly headcounts by the thousands. However, the overall impact is somewhat misleading. The hourly cost for direct labor employees has not been reduced. While the number of automobiles manufactured by the Big Three have declined in dramatic fashion, the actual cost of each automobile continues to be higher than its Japanese competition.

Will they be able to negotiate “voluntary” hourly labor cost reductions with the UAW?

One negative example from my turnaround experiences:

I was CEO of a legally insolvent, severely distressed manufacturing company. We asked the local union members to accept minor “voluntary” changes in the union labor contract. Specifically, we needed a delay in the contracted 3% increase in the base wage rate and an increase in the co-pay percentage for health insurance. These proposals were rejected by the local union leaders, although we had the International’s support for the changes. The local labor leaders proved indifferent to the company’s condition and were hostile to essential requests needed for the restructuring required to help save the company.

Admittedly this distressed company was not the size of GM, Ford or Chrysler. However experience suggests the UAW will not “voluntarily” agree to the significant reductions needed in hourly labor costs. (Which may require cuts as large as $10 per hour or more). Thus, the Big Three will be forced to attempt to terminate the labor agreement in Bankruptcy Court. If they fail to do so, they will continue to decline. And their future will offer even more desperate operating and financial conditions.

Managing & The Firestone Debacle

David Wessel's article in the Wall Street Journal on January 10, 2002, titled “The Hidden Cost of Labor Strife” describes how incorrectly reducing labor costs results in higher operating costs.

Fortune Magazine often cites various examples of correctly reducing costs in difficult times, while encouraging employees to remain sympathetic, helpful, supportive of your decisions.,

At Emerson Electric, we never had employees be sympathetic and helpful when we sought wage cuts, job rule changes or downsizing. However we never encountered labor strife and rarely a strike. Chuck Knight was a ferociously difficult CEO with his officers. But he was very reasonable and fair, with lower level salaried or hourly employees.

As a result, we never offered harsh and unreasonable terms in any negotiation. We were trained to manage with a union including candid, frequent communication. We stopped trying to decertify unions essentially because of the poor return on investment. If the union chose to strike, we had built a strike hedge and organized non-union employees to staff the plant. We never lost a strike.

This Wall Street Journal article is based on the findings of two Princeton University professors. Firestone Tire offered harsh, one-sided rule changes, wage cuts with new 12-hour shifts in an effort to reduce its Decatur, IL costs. They defeated the strike. Workers were forced to return to work and accept the new terms. As a result, this plant produced the bulk of the defective tires that resulted in 40 deaths.

Fortune Magazine cites the reasons companies are rated 'Best to Work For': (1) Employees are treated with dignity and respect, (2) The CEO is personable and uses “random walk” to talk to employees informally. Employees said they want to see the CEO, touch him and talk to him, (3) Knowing what is going on in the company and how it is doing. The reasons for decisions. Communicating the why for a downsizing and the alternatives. (4) In bad times management and employees are treated the same. (5) All of which leads to “trust” of management, an important factor. (6) Money or salary was not a prime factor.

Interestingly, terminated employees in a downsizing within these 'Best To Work For' operations, were often understanding and productive, even while working their last day on the job.

Companies considered by employees to be the 'Best To Work For' tend to be best performers.

See Fortune's "100 Best Companies to Work For”