Tuesday, March 28, 2017
Broken Business Models: Sears & Kmart
Wednesday, May 6, 2015
My Leadership Excellence magazine article “Seven lessons from a turnaround CEO”
Monday, June 16, 2014
An Avoidable Manufacturing Failure?
Google announced in May that it has decided to close its Motorola MotoX smartphone plant. The Texas plant has been in operation for one year. Its smartphones will be manufactured in China and Brazil.
- Quality management down through the 3rd organization tier;
- Disciplined strategic focus – with an honest and periodically updated Situation Analysis;
- Superior culture with the absence of hubris and politics;
- Best Cost Producer – utilizing Lean, Kanban and Kaizen protocols;
- Productive, lean salaried employee organization – not just lean for hourly manufacturing employees;
- Regular Competitive Benchmarking and Value Analysis of the product lines;
- Effective application of capital spending – which is essential.
Is the Moto X smartphone competitive in features, performance and price point? CNET’s review concludes that it is a good quality and relatively competitive smartphone. Not perfect. But if the price points were set correctly and its manufacturing costs yielded positive profit margins, profitable unit sales should have been realized.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
General Motors – Has It Lost Its Credibility?
General Motors' April 2010 announcement: “G.M. is able to repay the taxpayers in full, with interest, ahead of schedule, because more customers are buying vehicles like the Chevrolet Malibu and Buick LaCrosse.”
The facts:
General Motors' April 2010 repayment totaled $6.7 billion.
The United States government gave General Motors $49.5 billion in 2009 to finance its bankruptcy. Thus only 14% of the total aid GM received from the government has been repaid. Not a full repayment.
Further complicating the issue comes from Mr. Neil Barofsky, the Inspector General overseeing the troubled asset program, when he testified before the Senate Finance Committee on April 20, 2010 that G.M. was using taxpayer money to make the loan repayment – not General Motors’ earnings.
Apparently the $6.7 billion came from the $13.4 billion of the United States government’s TARP money that had been put in a General Motor’s escrow account when GM was in bankruptcy. Thus the company is using US government money--to pay back the US government loan.
Further complicating the issue is the General Accountability Office’s December 2009 report that: "The Treasury is unlikely to recover the entirety of its investment in Chrysler or GM, given that the companies' values would have to grow substantially more than they have in the past."
Also coloring GM’s financial condition is that:
Is all of this true? If it is, the real issue is General Motors' loss of trust and credibility. Will consumers figure out that General Motor’s announcement is not true? That it was a misleading public relations ploy? If consumers do not trust a manufacturer, will they stop purchasing its product? For this short-term gain, will GM lose in the long run?● It has applied to the Department of Energy for a $10 billion loan to retool its plants.
● In 2009 it was unprofitable with deficit gross profits and operating losses.
● In the first months of 2010 its market share declined.
Sources:
New York Times.
Power Line.
Reason Foundation.
Monday, March 22, 2010
Lenders Change their Treatment of Troubled Loans
Reportedly lenders are “kicking the proverbial can down the street" by granting waivers. They are no longer forcing companies to default, or marking loans to market. This is quite unusual, as compared to prior practice.
Will this continue? Once the economy improves, will lenders focus on lending money? Or will lenders continue to be owners and manage the operating companies? Or will they return to selling troubled loans?
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Ford Motor Company Reports Profit – Positives and Negatives
“…the only major U.S. automaker to avoid bankruptcy, posted third-quarter net income of $997 million and its first operating profit since early 2008…”.
“…finished the third quarter with $23.8 billion in automotive cash, up from $21 billion at the end of the second quarter.”
“…U.S. market share increased to 15.8 percent for the first nine months, compared with 14.8 percent from a year earlier…”.
Certainly, registering a third-quarter 2009 positive profit with a market share gain are excellent and solid signals. Unfortunately it overlooks Ford’s negatives, which give pause and concern for the future.
The Negatives:
“…workers have overwhelmingly rejected contract changes that would have allowed the automaker to cut labor costs.” “Ford sought the deal to bring its labor costs in line with Detroit rivals Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors Co….”.
Bringing Ford's hourly labor costs in line with General Motor's and Chrysler's should not be the priority. The priority is to become cost competitive with USA based Japanese automotive manufacturers. Ford's, GM's and Chrysler's hourly base wage rates and benefit costs are reportedly $20 to $30 per hour higher than Japanese competitors. Doubtful these costs were reduced in the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies. This remains a huge problem.
“…workers felt they were being asked to sacrifice more than the company's executives. Ford CEO Alan Mulally made $17.7 million last year…”.
There is some justification in the Unionized Employees position on this issue. Hourly employees are well aware that officers of a major company have significantly higher incomes. This is not an issue in healthy economic times. But in poor economic periods, if Management is perceived as not sacrificing with all on board, then a disconnect is created, and polarization with contract rejection occurs.
A helpful signal for Unionized employees, to convey Management is being serious about reducing overhead costs, is if Ford has cut back on some Executive perks. Does Ford still have an executive dining room, replete with waitresses, multi-course menus, and silver finger bowls?
“He (Alan Mulally, CEO) hasn’t presided over an annual profit at Ford, which has posted three straight full-year losses totaling $30 billion.”
Other questions exist. For example, did the quarterly profit rely heavily on favorable product mix and pricing? Will these same conditions be available in future fiscal years?
The list of negatives should not detract from the solid job Mr. Mulally and his team has done in beginning Ford's turn around. The challenges are enormous, and Mr. Mulally has clearly moved it in the right direction.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Bankruptcy and the Financial Crisis
On June 30, 2009 New York University held an excellent seminar on “Bankruptcy and the Financial Crisis".
The link to view NYU's webcast of the seminar is included below.
The subjects discussed included:
1. Federal government policy on large financial institutions and managing too-big-to-fail firms.
2. Creditor’s rights particularly reconciling Chapter 11 filings with section 363 of the federal bankruptcy code. Has anything changed in the distressed trading markets based on the handling of the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies?
3. Will a large bank fail? Actions the federal government will take if there are failures. Is capitalism affected and sacrificed to expediency?
4. Bankruptcy trends and risks – increase in distressed businesses.
The “Creditor’s Rights” panel:
• Moderator: Thomas Cooley, Dean, NYU Stern School of Business
• Barry Adler, Professor, NYU School of Law
• Edward Altman, Professor, NYU Stern School of Business
• Gerald Rosenfeld, Deputy Chairman, Rothschild North America
The keynote speaker: Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City:
1. Mr. Hoenig rejected the notion that some firms are too-big-to-fail. He laid out a three-step plan to address troubled, large institutions and the need to avoid ad-hoc approaches.
2. He suggested that large firms be held accountable including replacing management.
The “What if a Large Bank is Failing?” panel:
• Moderator: Matthew Richardson, Professor, NYU Stern School of Business
• William Ackman, Pershing Square Capital Management LP
• Edward Altman, Professor, NYU Stern School of Business
• Micheal Krimminger, Special Advisor, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
• Nouriel Roubini, Professor, NYU Stern School of Business
• Myron Scholes, Chairman, Platinum Grove Asset Management

